Traps in Sustainable Development Governance: Reflection on the Fukushima Crisis for Rio+20 by Mori Katsuhiko et al.
5Traps in Sustainable 
Development Governance
I. Introduction
The Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 and the subsequent 
disasters of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant of the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO) highlighted the need for a serious debate on 
denuclearization and a green economy in Japan and in the world more broadly. 
The accident was local, but the problem is global.
It is reported that, during the disaster, control rods were inserted to stop 
nuclear fission, but no electric power was available to remove decay heat from 
the reactors and the pools for spent fuels. This led to blasts in the four reactors, 
resulting in catastrophic radiation leakage. Although TEPCO insisted that the 
main cause of the blackout was the “unexpected” tsunami waves, critics argued 
that the earthquake damaged key facilities, such as pipes and external power 
towers, and that therefore the antiquake safety guidelines were inadequate.
The risks of earthquakes and nuclear disasters have been discussed by 
seismologists and others since the 1970s.(1) With these warnings, why could 
the accident at Fukushima not be prevented? This paper attempts to answer 
this question by identifying four main traps: security, economic, social, and 
environmental. These traps are deeply embedded in the paradigm of sustainable 
development and the existing institutional responses to the tragedy of the 
commons. In order to develop a genuine green economy, both philosophical and 
institutional frameworks must be reconsidered at the United Nations Conference 
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II. Traps in Sustainable Development Pillars
This section will provide a framework of four traps to analyze the 
Fukushima crisis by critically examining the themes of Rio+20: “a green 
economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty reduction” and an 
“institutional framework for sustainable development.” The Rio+20 conference 
logo represents the three pillars of sustainable development: social, economic, 
and environmental. The three pillars have been formed and reconfirmed since 
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in 
Stockholm. 
Stockholm stressed a combination of “human” and “environmental” 
aspects and addressed underdevelopment in developing countries. Yet, because 
few leaders from socialist and developing countries attended the conference, 
the developed countries’ main concerns about the environmental pillar were 
highlighted. As a result, the institution produced by the Stockholm Conference 
was the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
In 1982, the special session of the UNEP Governing Council was held 
in Nairobi, and the World Charter for Nature was adopted at the UN General 
Assembly. Ironically, the first UN organization headquartered in the developing 
world focused on the environment, despite the fact that the main concern of the 
global south was development.
At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the economic and development pillars were 
more visibly integrated into environmental governance, as exemplified by the 
establishment of the Global Environment Facility. The Rio Summit also created 
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to ensure linkage between the 
environmental and development communities.
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 
the three pillars were reconfirmed, and partnerships by multiple stakeholders were 
widely recognized as a framework for sustainable development governance that 
was considered likely to be effective.
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How various stakeholders can effectively integrate the three pillars remains 
the core question, but Rio+20 should go beyond these three components. A 
missing pillar of sustainable development is peace and security. The Stockholm 
Declaration, adopted during the Cold War period, contained the principle of the 
elimination of “nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction.”(2) 
Agenda 21, adopted at Rio, promoted the safe and environmentally sound 
management of radioactive waste. However, the peace and security aspects 
were deemphasized in the Rio and Johannesburg declarations, both of which 
were adopted after the Cold War. The linkage between peace and development 
has been increasingly recognized in the post-9.11 world, and a decent green 
economy will not be achieved without integrating this pillar into sustainable 
development governance.
In the institutional context of global environmental governance, Garrett 
Hardin’s classical explanation of environmental destruction as the tragedy of 
the commons should be reconsidered.(3) To solve the dilemma of overgrazing the 
commons, which are regarded as the property of no one (res nullius), there exist 
at least four prototype solutions.
The first approach is market-oriented environmentalism. Its prescription 
is the transformation of the commons into private property, as exemplified by 
the enclosure movement. By so doing, the environment is to be conserved at 
a sustainable level by egoistic individuals in order to suit their own interests. 
It will work only if incentives to use resources sustainably are internalized 
into human behavior, and if the necessary information is fully available. 
However, the belief in sustainable economic growth and individualism can be 
sources of what Ulrich Beck calls a “world risk society,” where a future risk is 
uncontrollable in the modernity paradigm.(4) It is far from the original meaning 
of oikonomia, or “dwelling (household) governance.” This departure is the 
economic trap.
The second approach is regulatory environmentalism. It  is the 
transformation of the commons into state property (like a Soviet-era state farm 
sovkhoz), or strengthening state regulation of public goods (like a Soviet-era 
8collective farm kolkhoz). The effectiveness of this approach depends on the 
legitimacy and capability of the authority. This is based on a hierarchical model 
for military discipline. As the etymology of security stems from “without care” 
or “careless,” the security dilemma (literally a “careless” mistake) can arise from 
this model both internationally and internally. Herein lies the security trap.
The third approach is plurilateral environmentalism. This is the 
transformation of the commons into “club” goods. The natural resources are used 
exclusively by one group, whose members share them as nonrivalrous goods. 
When negotiation costs to provide public goods are high, like-minded people 
may form plurilateral institutions for the sustainable use of resources. However, 
aristocratic governance becomes tainted by crises, drastically restructuring the 
economy into an oligarchic society through what Naomi Klein calls the “shock 
doctrine” of “disaster capitalism.” (5) Although society is expected to be a friendly 
group of people in an ordered community, it can be degraded into an exclusive 
club of unaccountable elites lacking a sound system of checks and balances. 
This is the social trap.
The fourth approach is civic governance by multiple stakeholders, who 
transform common property into the real commons (res communis). Based 
on values and knowledge shared by both state and nonstate actors, the 
environment can be used and maintained sustainably through stakeholders’ 
dialogue and communication. Rebecca Solnit argued that the mutual help of 
civic associations liberated from both the state and market society “emerges” in 
an “emergency” situation.(6) This is because disasters affect elites as well as the 
masses. According to Beck, “poverty is hierarchic, while smog is democratic.”(7) 
However, the anthropocentric concept of environmental conservation still 
regards the environment as being detached from human beings. As the 
etymology of disaster refers to “bad planet” or “detached planet,” the planet 
cannot be detached from humans; nor can nature be separated into parts, because 
the atmosphere, geosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere are all connected. The 
conception of the detached environment can be the very source of disaster, 
which I call the environmental trap.
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The above framework for catching and holding our attention will be applied 
in examining some key discourses on the causes of the nuclear crisis associated 
with the 3.11 disaster in Japan.
III. The Security Trap: “Atoms for Peace” and “Energy Security”
The epitaph of the Hiroshima atomic bomb cenotaph says, “Rest in peace; 
for we shall not repeat the error.” Despite this commitment, Japan made the 
mistake of not rejecting nuclear power. The early history of the introduction of 
nuclear energy to Japan was closely related to the nonproliferation strategy of 
the Eisenhower Administration during the Cold War. The US responded to the 
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons by using the rhetoric of “Atoms 
for Peace” and by establishing the regime of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).(8) The US Information Service collaborated with Matsutaro 
Shoriki – the president of Yomiuri newspaper and Nippon Television at that 
time, who became the first chair of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and 
the first director-general of the Science and Technology Agency (STA) in charge 
of nuclear power administration – for the transfer of nuclear technology, while 
suppressing antinuclear and anti-US sentiment after the Lucky Dragon No. 5 
fishing boat was contaminated by the US nuclear test on Bikini Atoll in 1954.
Young Yasuhiro Nakasone successfully submitted to the Diet in 1954 
the budget to build the first nuclear reactor, after his trip to the US on Henry 
Kissinger’s invitation. Although the Japanese nuclear power project started in 
the context of “Atoms for Peace,” as Nakasone mentioned at the Diet commerce 
committee in 1955, this did not mean that Japan legally and technically 
discarded the potential of possessing nuclear weapons. It can be inferred from 
Nakasone’s action (as well as Germany’s Franz Josef Strauss’ actions) that he 
sought the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament until at least 1970.(9)
Even after the Diet formally adopted in 1971 the resolution of the three 
nonnuclear principles, a government official mentioned in 1982 that the 
Japanese Constitution does not prohibit minimum self-defense forces, whether 
nuclear weapons or conventional weapons.(10) The plutonium accumulating from 
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“peaceful” reactors guaranteed Japan the technical means to develop nuclear 
weapons. Thus, the security dilemma was internalized through the proliferation 
of nuclear power: weapons and energy were linked. A threat was set within their 
territories.
The development of nuclear power plants was further promoted in Japan as 
well as in other nations, such as France, using the concept of “energy security” 
following the oil crisis of the 1970s. While the Environmental Agency was 
created in 1971, one year before the Stockholm Conference, the Agency for 
Natural Resources and Energy was also established under the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1973 to seek a stable energy supply 
through the nuclear fuel cycle plan.
After the 1974 radiation leaks from the nuclear-powered ship, Mutsu, the 
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) was established as a spin-off of the AEC, 
and was further “strengthened” after the JCO criticality accident of 1999. 
Despite the institutional reforms, the NSC did not function well at the TEPCO 
Fukushima accident: although the NSC recognized in the early stages of the 
crisis that the accident might be a Level 7 event, it was not until April 12 that 
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (METI) officially made a Level 7 announcement.
It is said that the institutional failure originated from the administrative 
reform of 2001, when the STA was dissolved and its functions integrated into 
the newly created METI and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology (MEXT). Since then, commercial nuclear power plants have 
been “regulated” (actually, promoted) mainly by METI’s NISA. In accordance 
with the Basic Law on Energy Policy of 2002, the Basic Energy Plan was 
adopted with the three Es (Energy security, Environment, and Economy) as 
the core components of Japan’s energy policy. Although safety is mentioned 
in the context of energy security, it is not recognized as a core component. 
Instead of the social pillar, the security pillar was consolidated jointly with 
the environmental and economic pillars as Japan’s energy policy focus. Social 
movements for nuclear safety have challenged state-led nuclearization through 
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the court system, but all plaintiff attempts have been eventually defeated.
Japan’s “energy security” strategy emerged not with the nationalization 
of nuclear energy, but rather with a national policy of promoting regionally 
monopolized private commercial development of nuclear power plants. 
TEPCO and other electric companies have been heavily guided by what 
Chalmers Jonson called the developmental state.(11) However, many people 
felt that the government’s announcement of the emergency response in 2011 
was inappropriate, and it was often compared to the false announcement of 
downplayed losses made by the Imperial General Headquarters during World 
War II.
At the international level, as of March 2011, both the IAEA and 
International Energy Agency (IEA) were directed by Japanese. IAEA director-
general Yukiya Amano argued that even after the Fukushima accident, nuclear 
power would remain an option for many countries as “a stable and clean source 
of energy.”(12) Former IEA director-general Nobuo Tanaka stated, “if nuclear 
power is available only at lower ends of projections, costs of low-carbon 
technology will be higher.”(13) These statements indicate that the position of the 
Japanese government, as well as those of many other nuclear-capable countries, 
remains unchanged even after the Fukushima disaster. This is in contrast to 
position of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), established by 
the initiative of Germany after the Johannesburg Summit to advance renewable 
energies on a global scale. IRENA director-general Adnan Amin said, “the 
impetus towards looking at renewables today has definitely strengthened” after 
Fukushima.(14) All these international organizations, however, share the view 
that the choice of energy source is a sovereign decision. IRENA can be regarded 
as an institutional attempt to challenge the inadequacy of the IAEA’s nuclear 
power dominance and the IEA’s club of oil-consuming developed countries. At 
the same time, promoting renewable energy development can be understood as 
an attempt to regain state control over energy development risks, which are no 
longer adequately controllable by the IAEA and IEA.
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IV. The Economic Trap: “Too Cheap to Meter” and “Regional 
Development”
Another trap lies in market efficiency for sustained economic growth. Pro-
nuclear power advocates have long argued that nuclear power is economical 
or “too cheap to meter.”(15) The Japanese government has estimated the unit 
cost of electricity by source, and argued that nuclear power is cheapest. For 
instance, the most recent cost estimates based on the model plants presented by 
the Federation of Electric Companies of Japan in 2004 at the METI Advisory 
Committee for Natural Resources and Energy suggested that the cost of nuclear 
power generation was lower than that of thermal and hydraulic power: for 
instance, 5.3 yen per kWh for nuclear, 5.7 yen for coal-fired, 6.2 yen for liquid 
natural gas-fired, 10.7 yen for oil-fired (utilization ratio, 80%; discount rate, 
3%; plant operational lifetime, 40 years), and 11.9 yen for general hydraulic 
(utilization ratio, 45%; discount ratio 3%; plant operational lifetime, 40 years) 
power.(16) 
However, these estimates were unrelated to actual plant operating 
performance and excluded important back-end costs and government subsidies 
related to nuclear power plant development.(17) According to the study by Kenichi 
Oshima based on performance data available from the financial statements of 
electric companies, it cannot be concluded that the unit cost of nuclear power is 
cheapest: 10.68 (8.64) yen per kWh for nuclear power, 9.90 (9.80) for thermal 
combined, 3.98 (3.88) yen for general hydraulic, 53.14 (51.87) for pumping-up 
hydraulic, and 12.23 (10.13) yen for nuclear power plus pumping-up hydraulic 
(numbers in parentheses exclude subsidies) on average during 1970–2007.(18) 
One of the main reasons for nuclear power’s reputation as having the “cheapest” 
price is that the cost of nuclear power is transferred to hydraulic power by 
adding the cost of the pumping-up hydraulic power using the excessive amounts 
of electricity generated by nuclear power plants during night hours.(19) When 
these costs are taken into account, nuclear power generation can be the most 
expensive.
Cost-plus pricing is another institutional reason for the expansion of nuclear 
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power in Japan. Through this mechanism, a predetermined percentage of the 
per unit cost of electricity generation is added to electricity prices to provide 
a profit margin for a utility company. In order for an electric power company 
to increase its profit margin, it must simply increase its investment in more 
expensive facilities (even if they are less feasible), such as nuclear power plants, 
reprocessing plants, and spent fuel storage facilities. Thus, electricity prices in 
Japan remain one of the highest among OECD countries.
High electricity prices undermine industrial competitiveness, but electric 
power companies offer large-scale industrial customers a series of “emergency 
time adjustment contracts,” with which they can enjoy discounted electricity 
prices in nonemergency times subject to the condition that electricity supply is 
to be reduced during excess-demand emergency times. It is unclear the extent to 
which this supply-demand adjustment was actually implemented during “planned 
rotating blackouts” after the 3.11 emergency period, but METI resorted to 
limiting power usage for large-scale users for the summer months of 2011 based 
on the Electricity Business Law.
Another reason for the high cost of nuclear power generation is the large 
government subsidies to the marginalized areas where nuclear power plants 
operate. In 1974, immediately after the oil price shock, Prime Minister Kakuei 
Tanaka and MITI Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone successfully established the 
so-called three power source siting laws, which require electric power firms 
to pay tax (which is actually passed on to electricity consumers via increased 
prices) to the government’s special account for the promotion of power resource 
development and for subsidies to the local governments that host nuclear plants 
and to their neighbors. Depopulated coastline communities with agriculture and 
fishery industries have been targeted as sites for nuclear power plants, partly 
as a disaster prevention measure to protect large cities, and partly as a poverty 
alleviation measure for marginalized villages. According to the perspective of 
Prime Minister Tanaka, elected from the rural area of Niigata Prefecture, this 
was an institutionalized solution to regional economic disparity. Prime Minister 
Tanaka said, “Why don’t we build up here something which Tokyo cannot 
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build in Tokyo? Let us send them electricity, and let them send us money.”(20) 
The world’s largest nuclear power plant operated by TEPCO was established 
in Prime Minister Tanaka’s constituency, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa. Using these 
subsidies, a number of paved roads and public facilities were built by general 
contractors. When the maintenance costs of these infrastructure facilities could 
no longer be paid, the local host government attracted the development of 
another nuclear power plant in order to receive additional subsidies. Thus, many 
nuclear power plants have been built in these marginalized areas. 
In this situation, the anti-nuclear power movement can become 
counterproductive, leading to unintended consequences: because the more 
active anti-nuclear power movements are, the more need of expensive public 
acceptance programs are recognized by the government. It has been reported 
that the antinuclear movement was actually encouraged by pronuclear local 
advocates with the intention of increasing the financial profits of pronuclear 
locals.(21) The vicious circle also contributed to an increased number of nuclear 
power reactors concentrated in these areas, increasing the hazards faced by 
locals and jeopardizing local autonomy.
In order to denuclearize and promote renewable energies, institutionalization 
for both market efficiency and local autonomy should be taken into account. 
Some solutions recommended by market-environmentalists are “negawatt 
power” and demand-side management for increased efficiency in energy 
conservation and for reduced energy consumption. A first step can be the 
introduction of time-based pricing, which sets higher prices for peak times, as 
implemented in France.(22) The government subsidies used for nuclear power 
generation can be transferred to provide incentives for energy-saving products 
and activities and for research and development into renewable energy.
Another important institutional agenda is the division of electric power 
generation from distribution. Electrical grids for delivering electricity in Japan 
are currently owned by eleven private power generation companies that have 
near monopolies in the respective service areas. In this case, the electrical grid 
should be transformed from monopolized private property to a smart grid that is 
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a collective good or common.
Following the Price-Anderson Act in the US, Japan’s current Law on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage imposes liability on the nuclear power plant 
operator for damages caused by nuclear accidents. Compensation of up to 120 
billion yen per nuclear power plant is available under insurance. Full coverage 
by the private insurance industry is regarded as impossible for the operation 
of high-risk nuclear power generation. Although it is not clearly stated in the 
wording of the law, it is understood that the nuclear power plant operator has 
no cap on its liability. If, however, the damage is caused by “an abnormally 
large natural disaster or social unrest,” the nuclear power plant operator may 
be exempted from paying compensation.(23) TEPCO has frequently emphasized 
that the Fukushima accident was caused by an “unprecedented” tsunami, so 
that they can be exempted from liability; they would argue that the government 
should bear the cost of compensation, both domestic and possibly overseas.(24) 
The Japanese government argues that the Fukushima accident is not a case of 
exemption from liability because it did not involve a “historically unimaginable” 
earthquake and tsunami.
The TEPCO rescue plan approved by the Diet is designed to protect TEPCO 
from bankruptcy at the expense of taxpayers and electricity users under the 
regional monopoly. If the state takes responsibility for TEPCO’s liability, some 
argue that the power distribution grid should be collateral for compensation, 
and that both the grid and the regional power generation monopolies themselves 
should be made public goods. A proposal for a feed-in tariff for renewable 
energies was actually adopted in Japan at the cabinet meeting held several hours 
before the earthquake of March 11, 2011. The unit cost of power generation by 
renewable energy, which was initially high, has been decreasing. It is reported 
that the per kWh cost of solar photovoltaic systems decreased below that of 
power from new nuclear power plants in 2010 in North Carolina, and that the 
cost of solar energy will decrease further below the cost of nuclear energy.(25) 
A network of geographically dispersed and cooperative smart grids will 
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contribute to local autonomy and supply decent jobs for regional development. 
Local production and local consumption of renewable energies can replace the 
putatively “cheap” but not actually economical energy of nuclear power, which 
carries many hidden costs and risks.
V. The Social Trap: The “Safety Myth” and “Nuclear Power Village”
The image of “peaceful, efficient, and clean” nuclear energy has been 
strengthened by a groundless belief that Japan’s nuclear power plants are 
absolutely safe. “In Japan, we have something called the ‘safety myth,’” METI 
Minister Banri Kaieda said at the IAEA meeting. “It’s a fact that there was an 
unreasonable overconfidence in Japan’s nuclear power generation technology.”(26) 
Such a belief has been socially constructed by what critics call the “nuclear 
power village” people. The absence of emergency technology and equipment is 
explained by this myth. The cost of preventive equipment is one reason, but a 
more serious reason is the social and psychological mindset among the “nuclear 
power village” people. Introducing such equipment would imply an admission 
that nuclear power is unsafe, undermining the premise that Japan’s nuclear 
power is absolutely safe.
The structure of the like-minded “village” of corporate, political, and 
academic stakeholders in nuclear power is influenced by a cycle of reciprocal 
favors between members: politicians and bureaucrats provide the industry 
with lax regulations and with a higher nuclear power target share in the energy 
plan, even after discovering operational faults and new information regarding 
earthquake and tsunami risks; in turn, the nuclear power industry appoints 
former senior bureaucrats (even a judge) and politicians to executive positions 
of the companies whom they formerly regulated. Business leaders of the 
Federation of Electric Power Companies support the Liberal Democratic Party, 
while the Federation of Electric Power Related Industry Workers Union of Japan 
supports the Democratic Party of Japan. The labor union shifted to a pronuclear 
position when they transferred the risks of radiation exposure among laborers 
to unorganized subcontracted workers. Untrained, temporary laborers are used 
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for hazardous work that exposes them to radiation in regular as well as crisis 
situations.(27) The nuclear industry makes donations to academia for research and 
education related to nuclear energy, and academia sends graduates to the nuclear 
industry in turn. The state provides positions and subsidies for the academics, 
who in turn support government policies promoting nuclear power. The 
media also uses pronuclear academics to promote the safety myth. Politicians, 
bureaucrats, businesspeople, and academics, who raised questions about the 
safety of nuclear energy, have been discriminated against and marginalized from 
the “nuclear power village.”
The institutional development of the “nuclear power village” explains why 
preventive measures were inadequate and also why the disaster responses were 
delayed and confused; the fallacy of the safety myth and the role of the “village” 
were revealed mainly by alternative media on the Internet and by civil society 
organizations.
After the accident, official statements and actions organizing the evacuation 
of local residents and safety measures for workers, food, and drinking water 
were largely confused. One of the typical confusions relates to the evacuation 
standards and radiation exposure standards for schools in Fukushima Prefecture. 
The Emergency Response Support System did not work, reportedly because 
of a blackout, and the data from the System for Prediction of Environmental 
Emergency Dose Information were not matched by the necessary immediate 
evacuation measures, reportedly to prevent a panic. Critics argue that it is the 
elites, not the public, who were in a panic. It took more than one month after 
the explosions for the government to set the “planned evacuation zone” as the 
area within a 30 km radius of the power plant. In the first month, those living 
in the hot spot areas had been exposed to radiation. It is estimated that soil 
contamination in some areas in Fukushima matches the level that prompted 
compulsory migration orders in the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The NSC 
guidelines for evacuation recommend remaining indoors or evacuating based on 
cumulative exposure forecasts: to remain indoors with 10–50 mSv for external 
exposure (exposure through the skin) or 100–500 mSv for internal exposure 
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(ingestion of radiation); and to evacuate with over 50 mSv for external exposure 
or over 500 mSv for internal exposure.(28) 
More contentiously, MEXT released an interim policy that outdoor activities 
in and outside schools in Fukushima Prefecture should be restricted as much as 
possible in schools where air dose rates of 3.8 µSv/h or more were measured in 
schoolyards or playgrounds.(29) According to MEXT, this policy was based on the 
recommendation by the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(ICRP) setting the “post-emergency situation” reference level for acceptable 
exposure in the band of 1-20 µSv per year. The 3.8 µSv/h dose rate is more than 
six times higher than the level accepted in radiation-controlled workplaces (0.6 µ
Sv/h) – where those under the age of 18 are prohibited to work, under the Labor 
Standard Law – and 20 times higher than the maximum safe adult exposure level 
set by the government.(30) Further, the policy did not take into account children’
s higher sensitivity to radiation or the possibility of internal radiation exposure. 
Thus, concerned parents and social actors demanded that the government retract 
the MEXT policy. Despite such social protests, MEXT maintained this policy, 
although it stressed that it was a temporary measure, and that it would attempt to 
reduce the radiation dose rate to 1 µSv/h where possible.
There is little disagreement that the deterministic (short-term) radiation 
effect on acute disorders has a threshold. The policy controversy is concentrated 
on the relationship between radiation dose and nondeterministic delayed effects, 
stemming from the scientific debate about the effects of radiation in the dose 
range for which epidemiological evidence is unavailable, below 100 mSv.(31) 
There exist at least three schools of thought. The first hypothesis assumes that 
there exists a “linear no-threshold” relationship between radiation dose and 
health effects in the unobserved dose range as well. US authorities take this 
position, using a linear no-threshold model that links to the observed effects. 
The ICPR model for external exposure (also applied for internal exposure) also 
hypothesizes a linear relationship, with a risk coefficient lower than that of the 
observed data from Hiroshima-Nagasaki victims. The second school of thought 
is that there is a threshold for negligible health effects due to the ability of 
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human cells to recover from radiation damage. Some nuclear promoters further 
argue that low-level radiation exposure can have beneficial effects on human 
health (radiation hormesis).(32) The third school of thought follows the rights-
based model developed by the European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR), 
who criticized the ICPR’s cost-benefit models of external exposure to radiation, 
which were inappropriately applied to internal exposure.(33) As the model was 
based on recent findings on epigenetic effects, such as bystander signaling 
and genomic instability, the ECRR recommended that the total maximum 
permissible dose limit should be kept below 0.1 mSv per year for members of 
the public, and 2 mSv for nuclear workers.
Many governments still adopt the model of the ICPR, which is closely 
connected to the IAEA. At the level of intergovernmental organizations, the 
1959 agreement between the IAEA and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
“has effectively gagged the WHO from telling the truth about the health risks 
of radiation.” (34) Some suggest that the ECRR is not an official authority, and 
was formed during a conference arranged by the Green Group of the European 
Parliament. The ECRR remains independent of the ICPR and the UN Committee 
on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. While the independence of the epistemic 
community is important, this independence may or may not influence advocacy 
for public policy and public campaigning.
The trap of the independence of the scientific community was also 
recognized by the early denuclearization movement in Japan, in the debate on 
“clock vs. hammer” among the founders of the Citizens’ Nuclear Information 
Center in Japan. While Jinzaburo Takagi argued the need for a social movement 
collaborating with alternative science, Mitsuo Taketani argued that “scientists 
have their own functions, and social activists have their own roles. A clock 
cannot become a hammer, and when the clock is used as a hammer it will 
be broken.”(35) In sum, it is important to form a collaborative network of 
independent, open, responsible civil society agents promoting a green economy, 
rather than a collusive network of dependent, closed, irresponsible “villagers” 
promoting nuclear power.
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VI. The Environmental Trap: “Nuclear Fuel Recycling” and “Clean 
Energy”
The environmental pillar was misused to justify nuclear power generation 
in Japan. Nuclear energy has been overhyped as “environmentally friendly” 
because “uranium is recyclable” and “nuclear fission does not emit any carbon 
dioxide.”
The advocates for spent fuel recycling have stressed that resource-poor 
Japan should conserve uranium resources. The originally intended nuclear fuel 
cycle involves the use of fast breeder reactors with mixed oxide (MOX) fuel; 
however, the fast breeder reactors were faced with a series of accidents and 
the data falsification scandal. Another cycle of the pluthermal project has also 
been faced with a series of problems at the reprocessing plant at Rokkasho, 
which continues to emit radioactive materials at a “safe” level into the air and 
the ocean, while also being involved in the production of “temporary” high-
level radioactive waste and the underground disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste. Unit 3 of the Fukushima No. 1 plant was one of the boiling water 
reactors that used MOX plutonium fuel. The radiation and radioactive materials 
emitted during the meltdown of the reactors and from the pools of spent rods at 
Fukushima No. 1 were a result of this failed recycling plan. These nuclear cycle 
programs do not constitute genuine “recycling” because no final disposal site 
for high-level radioactive waste is available. Critics refer to this situation as a 
“mansion with no toilet.”
Equally importantly, the phrase “nuclear energy is clean” has been widely 
used, especially after 1997, when Japan hosted the conference for the Kyoto 
Protocol on Climate Change. The budget relating to the Kyoto Protocol 
target achievement plan is spent primarily on nuclear power and carbon 
credit purchases through the Kyoto mechanism.(36) Even after the Fukushima 
accident, the Japanese government still promotes the export of nuclear reactors 
to developing countries, arguing that carbon credits related to nuclear energy 
should be introduced for climate change mitigation and sustainable development 
in developing countries. Vietnam recently selected Japan as the second preferred 
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country (following Russia) to jointly supply Southeast Asia’s first nuclear power 
plants. However, the front- and back-end processes of nuclear energy generation 
as well as plant building and decommissioning all emit greenhouse gases, and 
other social and environmental risks should be taken into account. 
The failing nuclear fuel cycle program and the “nuclear energy is clean” 
myth are insulated from the environmental legislature in Japan. Contamination 
by radioactive materials is effectively excluded from Japanese environmental 
laws, including the Air Pollution Control Law, the Soil Contamination 
Countermeasures Law, the Agricultural Land Soil Pollution Prevention Law, 
the Water Quality Pollution Control Law, the Law for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution and Marine Disasters, the Marine Fishery Resources Development 
Promotion Law, and the Wastes Disposal and Public Cleansing Law. The laws 
and rules on nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel and waste are all under the 
jurisdiction of nonenvironmental ministries, such as METI and MEXT. The 
exclusion of radioactive materials from environmental laws is based on the 
premise that the environment is common property, beyond the jurisdiction of 
environmental ministries. This fallacy originates from the anthropocentric view 
that human-made plutonium can be recycled, and a parochial perspective that 
views climate change as detached from other global environmental issues. The 
ontology of the environment as being the environs, that is, an outside zone that 
surrounds human beings, who are positioned at the center of concern, is very 
different from the worldview of indigenous peoples, as shown in the following 
poem:
To the earth I ask;
Was the weight unbearable?
Did it hurt you?
More deeply
We should have been aware
And in awe of you.
Your weight
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Your pain
We should have known the way to gauge.
People after people
Disappeared into waves
Together with your weight and pain
And
To the earth they returned.
That pain
We, numerous survivors,
Now awaken to
And we press our hands together
In its reverence. (37)
The above poem, “The Earth,” was written following the 3.11 earthquake 
by Shizue Ukaji, an indigenous Ainu artist and activist. She was told by her 
Japanese friend who read this poem, “Ainu people feel concerned about the land 
first, rather than the dead people, even in this disaster.” (38) A cleavage between 
the two worldviews exists regarding the inseparability of the land and human 
lineage. When I met Ms. Ukaji at the 2008 Indigenous Peoples Summit in 
Hokkaido, an American indigenous participant shared the following proverb: “We 
do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors. We borrow it from our children.” 
From an indigenous perspective, “the land is the property of nobody,” meaning 
that nature is divine and is a place where humans live and die. In this sense, 
nature cannot be owned by anybody. In other words, our bodies are nature itself, 
and the land, air, and water are ours only to care for.
If nature is regarded as common property, the risk of environmental 
damage is also imposed on everybody. When nature is contaminated, clouds, 
wind, air, land, water, milk, vegetables, meat, fish, clothes, and house walls all 
become threats to us. Here arises a responsibility on all stakeholders to protect 
nature and to prevent environmental catastrophes. The environment cannot be 
owned, but rather must be shared and cared for by everybody. To reconstruct 
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the concept of the commons, the epistemology based on the worldview of 
indigenous people should be shared. It is erroneous to believe that traditional 
indigenous life involves poverty. Rather, the meaning of the subsistence and 
resilience of the “original affluent society” must be learned.(39) Reducing energy 
demand and degrowth do not mean a return to the Stone Age; it is what some 
postdevelopmentalists call conviviality.(40) 
In considering alternative and renewable energies, a convivial relationship 
between nature and human beings can be considered. First, passive energy 
directly harnessed to achieve certain human needs, such as heating, cooling, and 
lighting, requires little energy and thus reduces overall energy consumption. 
Policy and institutional innovations for such efforts must be promoted. Second, 
in promoting renewables, it is necessary to consult with indigenous and local 
peoples to ensure that the energy solutions are acceptable to them. Large-scale 
dams would not be acceptable to indigenous communities, whereas small-scale 
hydropower and wind power may be acceptable. The potential of geothermal 
power plants is also high in earthquake zones, although consultation with the 
regulator of national parks and the hot spring industry is needed.(41) Wave energy 
is said to be one of the most efficient methods per unit of area, and further 
research and development should be conducted in the East Asian region. The key 
point here is that large-scale atomic energy generation in a centralized system is 
always accompanied by a continuous increase in energy consumption, whereas 
small-scale renewable energies, which are locally autonomous, geographically 
dispersed, and functionally cooperative, can reduce energy consumption, provide 
subsistence, and be decent, resilient, and sustainable.(42) 
VII. Conclusion
The nuclear crisis at Fukushima is a failure of Japan’s quest for autonomy 
and sustainable development. Despite the fact that nuclear energy is militarily 
insecure, economically inefficient, socially unhealthy, and environmentally 
unsustainable, the Japanese people were easily trapped by socially constructed 
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myths. To make Fukushima a significant turning point leading to a genuine green 
economy with alternative renewable energy, it is important for us to reflect on 
both the philosophical and institutional meanings of “sustainable development” 
and the “property” approaches to the tragedy of the commons.
Denuclearization may or may not be accompanied by demilitarization, 
degrowth, democracy, and deconstruction of the orthodox concept of the 
environment. The earthquake shook everything on the land, including the 
foundation of our worldview; the tsunami swept away so many lives and 
structures, as well as the veil of the traps; and the explosions at the Fukushima 
nuclear power plants produced radioactive clouds that blocked any rays of light 
from “basking in the warmth of the atomic sunshine,”(43) while shining on an 
opportunity for a green, resilient, and decent economy and governance.
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Traps in Sustainable Development Governance:
Reflection on the Fukushima Crisis for Rio+20
<Summary>
Katsuhiko Mori
With ample warnings of possible nuclear disasters triggered by earthquakes 
and tsunamis, why could the accident in the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
not be prevented? During the 40 years since the Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment, four main traps have been identified: security, economic, 
social, and environmental. These traps are deeply embedded in the paradigm 
of sustainable development as well as the institutional responses to the tragedy 
of the commons. For a genuine green economy in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation, both philosophical and institutional 
frameworks for denuclearization must be reconsidered.

